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Piracy	could	be	a	blessing	in	disguise	for	content
supply	chains
“He	intends	only	his	own	gain,	and	he	is	in	this,	as	in	many	other	cases,	led	by	an	 invisible	hand	to	promote	an	end
which	was	no	part	of	his	intention.	Nor	is	it	always	the	worse	for	society	that	it	was	no	part	of	his	intention”.						—
Adam	Smith,	Wealth	of	Nations,	p.	477
Manufacturers	of	information	goods	—	music,	movies,	TV	shows,	video	games,	e-books,	and	software	—	often	see
piracy	as	a	pesky	issue.	And	understandably	so.	Piracy	gives	consumers	an	alternative	to	purchasing	the	legal
version	and	thus,	to	a	manufacturer,	it	presents	a	shadow	competition.	The	manufacturer	facing	piracy	loses	some	of
its	pricing	power	and	is	forced	to	cede	a	portion	of	the	market	to	piracy.	Therefore,	the	common	wisdom	is	that	the
manufacturer	is	better	off	with	stricter	anti-piracy	enforcement	and	lesser	piracy.
What	makes	the	situation	even	grimmer	is	that,	often,	the	manufacturer	itself	does	not	get	to	set	the	retail	price;
instead,	a	downstream	firm	—	a	retailer	—	does.	A	large	variety	of	information	goods,	sold	in	multiple	formats	—
ranging	from	shrink-wrapped	CDs	and	DVDs	all	the	way	to	cable	TV	content	—	are	brought	to	market	following	this
wholesale	model.	When	the	manufacturer	sells	to	the	retailer,	and	the	retailer	resells	to	consumers,	the	supply	chain
faces	a	well-known	vertical	externality,	also	called	double	marginalisation.	Essentially,	absent	prior	coordination,	the
manufacturer	decides	on	its	margin,	and	the	retailer	adds	its	own	margin	on	top	of	that,	hence	the	name	double
marginalisation.
The	vertical	externality	manifests	itself	in	a	higher	retail	price	and	a	reduced	output,	when	compared	to	a	vertically
integrated	channel	where	the	manufacturer	and	the	retailer	are	owned	by	the	same	firm.	This	externality	adds	to	the
downward	pressure	on	profit,	on	top	of	what	is	already	exerted	by	piracy.	The	case	of	cable	TV	is	instructive.	The
cable	network	(e.g.,	HBO)	charges	the	local	cable	operator	(e.g.,	Comcast)	a	per-subscriber	fee	akin	to	the
wholesale	price,	and	the	cable	operator	then	decides	on	its	own	margin,	which	writes	the	final	retail	price	tag.	As
Caves	writes	in	his	book,	“the	cable	operator	enjoys	a	local	monopoly,	and	the	cable	network	offers	a	product
differentiated	from	its	rivals’,	so	double	marginalization	is	indeed	a	hazard.”
Interestingly	enough,	piracy	must	also	be	a	big	issue	for	the	cable	TV	industry,	especially	the	content	producers.	All
types	of	cable	TV	content	—	ranging	from	original	TV	series	and	sitcoms,	all	the	way	to	sporting	events,	concerts,
and	shows	—	happen	to	be	quite	a	popular	target	for	digital	pirates.	Consider	HBO’s	popular	TV	series	“Game	of
Thrones.”	Within	just	12	hours	of	its	original	broadcasting,	the	season	four	finale	was	downloaded	1.5	million	times,
which	was	close	to	2	petabytes	transferred	in	just	half	a	day.	And,	the	trend	continues	unabated	with	all	the
subsequent	seasons;	see	here,	here,	and	here.
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At	the	same	time,	though,	despite	having	declared	war	on	piracy	last	year,	HBO	has	done	little	to	combat	it
effectively.	It	seems	strange	that,	even	when	facing	such	a	high	piracy	rate	—	one	billion	illegal	downloads	of	season
seven	of	Game	of	Thrones,	compared	to	only	16.1	million	of	its	legal	views	—	HBO	chooses	to	not	take	stricter
actions	or	measures.	So	far,	it	has	no	real	plans	to	counter	the	illegal	streaming	services,	and	it	lets	off	illegal
downloaders	with	only	a	slap	on	the	wrist.	Perhaps,	HBO	does	not	really	care.
It	is	only	natural	to	ask	then:	facing	the	twin	threat	of	piracy	and	double	marginalisation,	why	do	manufacturers	(such
as	HBO)	not	take	stricter	anti-piracy	measures?	At	the	same	time	as	well,	why	does	HBO	not	take	steps	towards
better	channel	coordination,	for	example,	through	a	more	efficient	contracting	mechanism	with	Comcast?	Could	this
perhaps	be	the	case	where	two	wrongs	actually	make	a	right?	A	case	where	a	dose	of	piracy	eases	the	pain	of
vertical	externality?	And,	if	indeed	so,	what	policy	implications	does	it	have	for	a	government	in	terms	of	its	overall
anti-piracy	efforts?
Our	analysis	reveals	that	a	moderate	level	of	piracy	—	not	too	much	or	not	too	little	—	can	certainly	have	a	positive
impact	on	the	profits	of	the	manufacturer	and	retailer,	both	at	the	same	time.	Interestingly,	this	gain	in	their	profits
need	not	come	at	the	expense	of	the	consumers,	and	piracy	may	actually	lead	to	a	socially	desirable	win-win-win
situation.	Even	when	every	player	acts	in	his	or	her	own	self-interest—the	manufacturer	and	retailer	maximising	their
respective	profits	and	consumers	their	own	utility	—	the	‘invisible	hand’	of	piracy	somehow	makes	every	selfish	actor
richer,	resulting	in	the	ultimate	benevolent	outcome.	Here	is	how.
Piracy	has	an	impact	on	both	parties	in	the	supply	chain.	When	the	retailer	loses	a	consumer	to	piracy,	so	does	the
manufacturer.	This	way,	piracy	limits	the	pricing	power	of	not	just	the	manufacturer	but	also	of	the	retailer.	Even
though	a	limitation	on	its	own	pricing	power	—	the	first	order	effect	—	is	not	good	for	the	manufacturer,	the	limitation
on	the	retailer’s	power	—	the	second	order	effect	—	surely	is,	because	a	reduction	in	the	retailer’s	power	means	less
of	an	adverse	impact	from	double	marginalisation.	An	analogous	logic	applies	to	the	retailer	as	well.	At	a	moderate
dose	of	piracy,	the	second	order	effect	dominates	the	first,	making	both	parties	better	off.	In	the	midst	of	all	this,
consumers	always	benefit	from	the	lower	retail	price	guaranteed	by	piracy.
Now,	here	is	what	makes	piracy	special.	Neither	up-	nor	down-stream	competition	can	accomplish	alone	what	piracy
can.	More	competition	is	always	bad	for	the	party	facing	it,	but	is	certainly	good	for	the	other	party.	Piracy,	however,
presents	a	shadow	competition	not	just	to	the	manufacturer	or	the	retailer,	but	to	both.	A	moderate	dose	of	piracy
can	limit	the	pricing	power	of	both,	and	limit	them	just	enough	where	both	parties	are	better	off.	Naturally,	there	is	no
win-win-win	situation	with	either	up-	or	down-stream	competition,	though	such	a	situation	is	evidently	possible	within
the	context	of	piracy.
Of	course,	the	benevolent	effect	of	piracy	that	we	identify	should	not	be	misinterpreted	as	if	firms	should	suddenly
start	endorsing	piracy.	In	fact,	when	piracy	is	rampant,	its	negative	effect	dominates,	and	the	firms	are	worse	off	as
one	might	expect.	However,	anti-piracy	measures	are	often	expensive,	so	before	going	gung-ho	against	piracy,	one
must	pause	to	ponder	whether	doing	so	would	be	a	worthy	investment.	To	that	calculus,	we	simply	offer	another
important	variable	to	consider.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	is	based	on	the	authors’	paper	The	‘Invisible	Hand’	of	Piracy:	An	Economic	Analysis	of	the
Information	Goods	Supply	Chain.	MIS	Quarterly,	Forthcoming	December	2018.
The	post	gives	the	views	of	its	authors,	not	the	position	of	the	institutions	they	represent,	The	LSE	Business
Review	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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